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Text of Remarks on Panel: "Codes of
Conduct and Transparency"
BY CYNTHIA WILLIAMS*
Hello, I am Cynthia Williams and I'm here today to talk about a
strategy to promote greater corporate accountability using the federal
securities laws. The U.S. capital markets are noted for their financial
transparency. That financial transparency is the result of the
mandatory public disclosure of financial information on a quarterly
and annual basis by the 14,000 publicly listed companies in the United
States. The premise of my academic work is that there should be
corporate social transparency in the capital markets comparable to
the financial transparency that now exists, and that the means to
achieve corporate social transparency is to require public reporting
companies to disclose more information about the social, political,
environmental and human rights implications of their actions, here in
the United States and around the world.
What I am going to do today is define the types of expanded
disclosure that could create corporate social transparency, and then
talk about the statutory basis for suggesting that the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") could promote this type of
transparency under the federal securities laws. I will then talk about
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Professor and Sloan Fellow for the Study of Business Institutions, Georgetown
University Law Center, 2000-2001. The material in this talk is a summary of a much
longer Article on the subject. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. Rv. 1197 (1999).
That Article, in turn, builds upon work by securities law scholars in the early 1970s,
including work by the new Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Harvey L. Pitt. See Theodore Sonde & Harvey L. Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities
Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the Wind!", 16 How. L.J. 831 (1971)
(arguing that in shaping its disclosure policy, the SEC should require more disclosure
of social. and environmental information, since Congress intended that "the
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but rather, must accord its scope in a highly industrialized society to the full range of
man's concerns").
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what I think some of the potential benefits could be of expanded
corporate social transparency as a mechanism of corporate
accountability. I will conclude by discussing some of the political
benefits of a strategy that focuses on the SEC. I will leave for others
any discussion of the problems with this approach.
The concept of corporate social transparency is based on the idea
that investors and members of society should have consistent, high
quality, accurate information available about the social, political and
environmental effects of corporate action, both here and around the
world. Expanded social disclosure to create such transparency would
generally include specific information on the products companies
produce and where that production takes place; on the companies'
law compliance structures; on their labor relationships, both directly
and through subcontractors; on their domestic and global
environmental effects; and on corporate charitable and political
contributions. In essence, the goal is to create a format for social
auditing that would permit the dissemination of an accurate synopsis
of a company's social, political and environmental actions.
The statutory basis for suggesting that the SEC has the legal
authority to act to require the dissemination of this type of
information is Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which regulates proxy disclosure. Shareholders in large, public
companies vote on such issues as electing the board of directors on an
annual basis, or approving fundamental transactions such as a merger
or acquisition, through the proxy process. Prior to seeking
shareholders' votes, that is, their proxies, public companies must
provide full and accurate disclosure of facts relevant to the particular
decision at issue. The SEC defines which facts must be disclosed, and
it is a violation of Section 14(a) for a company or person to seek
shareholders' proxies without complying with the regulations,
including the disclosure regulations, that the SEC has promulgated.
Section 14 contains a very broad grant of authority to the SEC
to regulate the proxy process, including proxy disclosure. Specifically,
the SEC has been given the authority to develop regulations "as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."' This is clearly a broad grant of statutory authority. One
thing that is clear from the language of Section 14(a) is that the SEC
has the authority to develop proxy regulations to promote the "public
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994) (emphasis
added).
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interest," and that the SEC's "public interest" authority is separate
from its authority to protect investors, given Congress's use of the
disjunctive "or." The public interest that the SEC has the authority to
promote, however, has to be related to its general power to regulate
the capital markets.
So, looking at how one might construe the Section 14 public
interest power, you would look to the legislative history of this
section. And the legislative history of Section 14 makes it clear that
the goal Congress sought to achieve was for shareholders to know
how managers were managing the companies in which they invested.
Congress wanted shareholders to have more information about the
way their companies were being run and what management policies
their directors would seek to implement in the future, if elected, and
it enacted Section 14 as the statutory basis for providing shareholders
with this sort of information. Other sections of the 1934 Act were
enacted to ensure that shareholders were provided with accurate
financial information on a regular basis. Section 14, in contrast, had
as its primary goal providing non-financial information.
So, that legislative history informs how one would construe the
SEC's regulatory power pursuant to Section 14(a). And, I would
suggest, in 2001, "how companies are being managed" includes how
the company is dealing with important issues around the world and in
the United States concerning labor relationships, environmental
relationships, and others of the global human rights issues about
which we are concerned in today's meeting. So, to advance the
"public interest," the SEC should require public reporting companies
to disclose more of this kind of social, political and environmental
information in companies' annual proxy disclosures.
I'd like to turn now to the topic of what some of the benefits of
this type of disclosure might be. In my academic writing to date, I
have focused on benefits to investors. And I've looked very crudely
at investors as comprised of two types: (1) economic investors, and
(2) socially responsible investors. Obviously there is a significant
overlap between these categories of investors. But to economic
investors, people primarily concerned with the economic returns of
their investments, I would suggest (and I would suggest to the SEC)
that there is growing empirical evidence that the way companies treat
these important social issues has material financial implications.
One example of this financial materiality can be gleaned from a
recent study by the World Resources Institute ("WRI"), which
studied the financial implications of newly promulgated
2001]
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environmental regulations on thirteen companies in the paper and
pulp mill industry. The WRI study found that for those companies,
there was a wide variation in how those environmental regulations
could potentially affect the companies' financial results, depending on
where companies had their mills (whether they were on burdened
rivers or not), what kinds of investments they had previously made in
environmental abatement and modem technology, and what
approach the company had taken to managing environmental issues
generally. WRI estimated that some companies would show a net
positive impact on their value from these regulations, up to a positive
5% increase in their stock market value. Others would show a
negative impact on their stock market value, down to a negative 20%
in one case. Thus, WRI found real differences in how these
companies were going to be affected, financially, by these
environmental regulations. A securities lawyer would say this is
material, that is important, information. When WRI looked at these
companies' securities disclosure, however, each of these companies
either said they do not anticipate any material, financial effects from
the implementation of these regulations, or they said they anticipate
that there might be some financial effects but that those effects will be
the same for companies across the industry, which the WRI study
shows not to be the case. This is just one example among many other
empirical studies showing material financial effects from how a
company manages its environmental risks; other studies show
material financial effects from how companies manage their labor
relationships, or how they manage global human rights issues
generally. Thus this is economically material information that would
be of interest to an economic investor.
Second, I have argued that social, political and environmental
information is material per se to socially responsible investors
("SRIs"), since SRIs are using this information, to the extent it is
available, to make investment decisions. As you probably know, a
growing number of investors screen their investments for the social
practices of the companies in which they invest, as well as for the
financial outcomes that they can expect from those companies. In
fact, socially screened funds and investments generally are some of
the fastest growing sectors of money under management (of course,
that relative growth rate is in part due to the fact that SRI funds
represented a smaller amount of money to begin with, which is why
you see a higher relative growth rate). Some studies show that close
to 15% of money under professional management is being invested
[Vol. 24:415
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with some sort of social screen. And I would say in this regard that
the California Public Employees Retirement Fund ("CALPERS"),
which is the country's largest public pension fund, investing $160
billion, recently decided to screen all of their international
investments for the human rights records of the company in which
they were being asked to invest. I think that is a very important
development, and it shows that social and environmental information
is becoming increasingly important to investors as they make
investments. So that is the structure of the argument that I have
made in my academic writing: expanded social disclosure is necessary
to meet the informational requirements of SRIs, and it is useful to
economic investors because of the financial implications from how
companies manage important social relationships.
But I suggest that there are other benefits from an expanded
disclosure mandate as well. First, there are benefits to consumers.
Consumers are becoming increasingly concerned about the human
rights practices of companies that produce their goods, and in
particular do not want to support production in sweatshop conditions,
using child labor, or paying wages that do not meet basic human
needs. Expanded social disclosure would provide consistent, high
quality information to consumers on which they could base their
purchasing decisions with respect to these issues. Moreover, political
activists and NGOs could benefit from having high-quality social
information provided by companies, in a consistent, comparable
format. That information could inform further regulation, as
necessary, and possibly help to create the political conditions
necessary to enact such further regulations (I am assuming that the
potential of securities fraud liability for inaccurate or misleading
information or non-disclosure would help to assure that this
information being disclosed would be "high-quality" information).
I think that there are also benefits to the public generally from
requiring this disclosure, given the potential effects on managers from
acting with the knowledge that the results of their actions are going to
be made public. In this regard, I would point to another example
from California, which is Proposition 65. Probably many of you know
about Proposition 65, but I would like to read a bit from an article by
Professor Mary Graham in The Economist about Proposition 65.
Since 1986, Proposition 65 has required companies selling their
products in California to give reasonably clear warnings whenever
they expose people to cancer-causing chemicals and certain other
toxic substances. Contrary to what you might expect, Proposition 65
20011
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did not inspire a flurry of warnings. Rather, it did inspire a flurry of
efforts by nationally known companies to reduce the extent to which
they were exposing the public to lead and other dangerous chemicals.
Now, notice that Proposition 65 is not a regulation that establishes
standards for permissible levels of identified chemicals within
manufactured goods. It simply says to companies "disclose what you
are doing." But look what companies did, and I quote from The
Economist: "ten china companies agreed to cut the levels of lead in
their glazes in half; fourteen major plumbing supply manufacturers
agreed to produce brass faucets that are virtually lead free; ten
producers of calcium supplements agreed to reduce the amount of
lead in their tablets to almost nothing, all of the major food
processors sped up the elimination of lead solder from cans of chili,
and numerous other large companies removed carcinogens in
formulated car wax, carburetor cleaners, etc., etc., etc." Because
California is 15% of the national market, these companies made
reforms nationwide-not just for the products that they sell in
California. I cite this as one example of the power of disclosure as a
regulatory strategy.
Another example is TRI, which stands for the toxic release
inventory. TRI is a federal statute that since 1986 has required
manufacturing companies to report annually on the levels of toxic
chemicals that they've released, facility by facility, and chemical by
chemical. Again, reading from The Economist, "TRI is now credited
with enormous success, reducing releases of chemicals subject to the
law by more than 40%." This regulation did not say, "You must
reduce toxic releases." It just says to companies "tell the public what
levels of the following toxins you are releasing." I would point to this
potential to affect corporate actions as one of the most important
benefits of disclosure. Indeed, the fundamental premise of the
securities laws is that there is a "shrinking quality" to harmful actions
people will take if they are required to expose those actions to the
"disinfectant" of full public disclosure.
And finally, I submit that there are benefits to the companies
themselves from engaging in the reflective process necessary to
collect social and environmental information systematically, evaluate
it and make it public. Clearly some companies are already engaged in
such "social accounting" or "stakeholder disclosure," and these
companies have recognized internal benefits from engaging in the
underlying process of self-reflection. That is what I hear from
companies who adopt or try to adopt such social responsibility
[Vol. 24:415
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disclosure initiatives. One initiative of which you may be aware is the
Global Reporting Initiative ("GRI"), which is a voluntary initiative
under which certain companies have agreed to disclose specified
social and environmental information. The Ford Motor Company is a
member of the Global Reporting Initiative, and the General Counsel
of Ford has talked publicly of the benefits of GRI. He suggested that
the process of evaluating everything Ford did, from start to finish, in
order to report on it under the GRI, has helped Ford identify
numerous ways both to save money and to reduce their
environmental impact. Ford's General Counsel has also said that the
process of participating in GRI has opened up new channels of
communication in the company, and has helped to promote a greater
willingness to be self-critical within the company. He credits their
participation in the GRI process with helping the company respond
non-defensively and fully last summer, when there were
Congressional hearings about the Ford Voyager. If it is true that
"you manage what you measure," then requiring companies' social,
political and environmental impacts to be more precisely measured
will help them to be more intelligently managed, as we've seen with
Proposition 65 and the TRI. In some cases this will even enhance
profitability. Thus, we ought not underestimate the benefits to
companies themselves from these types of disclosure initiatives.
I see I have only one more minute. In one minute, I would say
that the political reason I think of this as a potentially important and
beneficial strategy is that it has the value of being a national
approach, given the necessity of convincing the Securities and
Exchange Commission, a federal agency in the United States, that
this is an important policy initiative that it should promulgate. That it
is a national approach is important, given the problems we have been
discussing of an international "sovereignty gap." And yet, it would
reach international corporate behavior, because any disclosure
schedule that would be responsive to the realities of economic
globalization would have to include disclosure on the social, political,
and environmental consequences of companies' international actions.
If one believes that the possibility of liability is an important
motivator, for some companies, to comply with the law, it is also
potentially useful that there could be liability consequences under the
federal securities laws for misleading disclosure, or misleading non-
disclosure.
My final sentence is that there is a coalition of organizations in
Washington, D.C., which is starting to lay the groundwork for this
2001]
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approach to the SEC. The coalition includes SRI investors and
money managers, the AFL-CIO Office of Investment, a number of
environmental groups, including the World Resources Institute, and
some academics. The coalition is organized by Michelle Chan-
Fischel, at Friends of the Earth. Voluntary initiatives such as the GRI
are extremely important self-regulatory mechanisms that lead the way
and demonstrate the feasibility of these social accounting techniques.
Yet, ultimately, I am still persuaded that mandatory approaches will
be necessary to address concerns of corporate accountability under
conditions of economic globalization. And one such mandatory
approach is for the SEC to require companies to disclose specific
information about their social, political and environmental actions.
Such disclosure could constrain harmful corporate action, and would
promote greater corporate accountability. Thank you.
